Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
Volume 46
Issue 4 Summer 2015

Article 10

2015

Holt v. Hobbs: RLUIPA Requires Religious
Exception to Prison's Beard Ban
Jonathan J. Sheffield
Alex S. Moe
Spencer K. Lickteig

Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Law Enforcement and Corrections
Commons, and the Religion Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Jonathan J. Sheffield, , Alex S. Moe, & Spencer K. Lickteig, Holt v. Hobbs: RLUIPA Requires Religious Exception to Prison's Beard Ban, 46
Loy. U. Chi. L. J. 1077 (2015).
Available at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj/vol46/iss4/10

This Developments is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola University Chicago
Law Journal by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.

SHEFFIELD PRINT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

4/27/2015 3:09 PM

Recent Development
Holt v. Hobbs: RLUIPA Requires Religious
Exception to Prison’s Beard Ban
Jonathan J. Sheffield,* Alex S. Moe,** and Spencer K. Lickteig***
For the past ten years, courts have grappled with deciding what
deference to give prison officials when prison regulations, though
intended to “maintain good order, security, and discipline,”1 also
substantially burden a prisoner’s religious exercise.2 In 2000, Congress
enacted the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(“RLUIPA”)3 “to provide very broad protection for religious liberty” of
prisoners and others.4 Pursuant to RLUIPA, if a prison’s policy
substantially burdens a prisoner’s religious exercise, the prison must
demonstrate that the policy is necessary to achieve a compelling
government interest.5 But in the 2005 case of Cutter v. Wilkinson, the
Supreme Court held that RLUIPA analysis is context-sensitive,6 and the
Court recognized that prison officials are due deference under
RLUIPA.7 Since 2005, lower courts have struggled to inject deference
into their “compelling interest” RLUIPA analyses.8 The Supreme Court
addressed this confusion in 2015 with Holt v. Hobbs,9 clarifying where

* B.A., University of Florida, 2009; J.D. Candidate, Loyola University Chicago School of
Law, 2015.
** B.A., Northwestern University, 2012; J.D. Candidate, Loyola University Chicago School
of Law, 2015.
*** B.S. 2008, Kansas State University; J.D. Candidate, Loyola University Chicago School of
Law, 2015.
1. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 723 (2005).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 6–9 (discussing the requirements of the burden).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2012).
4. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. —, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2760 (2014).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc.
6. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 723 (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003)).
7. Id. at 725 n.13.
8. Under RLUIPA, if the prison’s policy substantially burdens a prisoner’s religious exercise,
the prison must demonstrate that the policy is the least restrictive means of furthering a
compelling governmental interest. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a).
9. 574 U.S. —, 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015).
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deference to prison officials does not fit into RLUIPA analysis.
In Holt v. Hobbs, the Supreme Court, per Justice Alito,10 held that an
Arkansas prison violated RLUIPA by not granting a religious
exemption to the prison’s grooming policy prohibiting facial hair.11
The Arkansas prison’s grooming policy banned beards, excepting
prisoners with skin conditions, who were permitted a quarter-inch
beard.12 Prisoner Gregory Holt requested permission to grow a halfinch beard in accordance with his religious beliefs, but the prison denied
him a religious exemption.13 The federal district court and the Eighth
Circuit affirmed the prison’s decision.14
The Supreme Court reversed, determining that RLUIPA does not
permit “unquestioning deference” to prison officials’ assertions that
policies are necessary to achieve the prison’s compelling interest.15
Though the Court provided a clearer understanding of when deference
is not due to prison officials, one significant question remains: To what
extent should Cutter deference be given to prison officials when
deciding RLUIPA claims?
Congress intended RLUIPA to grant “expansive protection for
religious liberty.”16 In particular, section 3 of RLUIPA, the provision at
issue in Holt, provides:
No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious
exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution . . . unless
the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that
person––(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest;
and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.17

Furthermore, RLUIPA allows prisoners “to seek religious
accommodations pursuant to the same standard as set forth in [the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”)].”18 RFRA requires
courts to apply the same compelling-interest analysis as RLUIPA when
the federal government substantially burdens religious exercise.19 The
10. It bears note that Justice Alito also authored another recent case discussing regulatory
interaction with religious exercise, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. —, 134 S. Ct.
2751 (2014).
11. Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 859, 867.
12. Id. at 860–61.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 861–62; see Holt v. Hobbs, 509 F. App’x 561 (8th Cir. 2013), overruled by Holt,
135 S. Ct. 853 (2015).
15. See Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 864.
16. Id. at 860.
17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–1(a) (2012).
18. Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 436 (2006).
19. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. —, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2761–62 (2014).
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Court most recently interpreted the RFRA standards in Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby, recognizing that RFRA—and thus RLUIPA—was
enacted to provide greater protection for religious exercise than the First
Amendment.20 Notably, throughout its Holt opinion, the Court cited
Hobby Lobby to support its reasoning under RLUIPA.21
The Holt Court also observed that several sections of RLUIPA
underscore its expansive protection for religious liberty.22 First,
RLUIPA defines “religious exercise” as “any exercise of religion,
whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious
belief.”23 Second, RLUIPA requires that this definition “be construed
in favor of a broad protection of religious exercise, to the maximum
extent permitted by the terms of this chapter and the Constitution.”24
Third, and finally, RLUIPA “may require a government to incur
expenses in its own operations to avoid imposing a substantial burden
on religious exercise.”25
With that background in mind, the Court applied RLUIPA to Holt’s
case. Holt is a devout Muslim incarcerated in an Arkansas state prison.
The Arkansas Department of Correction’s (“Prison”) grooming policy
prohibited prisoners from wearing facial hair other than a neatly
trimmed mustache, or, if an inmate had a diagnosed medical problem, a
quarter-inch beard. The policy granted no exemptions to prisoners who
were required to grow a beard on religious grounds. Nevertheless, Holt
requested permission to grow a half-inch beard as a compromise
between the Prison’s policy and his faith, which required him not to
trim his beard at all. Prison officials denied his request.26
Holt sought judicial redress, filing a pro se complaint in federal
district court challenging under RLUIPA the Prison’s decision to deny
his request for an exemption. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Arkansas adopted the recommendation of the magistrate
judge assigned to Holt’s case, who had concluded that Holt’s complaint
should be dismissed.27 The magistrate emphasized that prison officials
are entitled to deference and the Prison’s grooming policy allowed Holt
to exercise his religion in ways other than growing a beard, such as by
20. Id.
21. See, e.g., Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. —, 135 S. Ct. 853, 859–60, 862–64, 867 (2015).
22. Id. at 860.
23. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–5(7)(A) (2012)).
24. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–3(g)).
25. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–3(c)).
26. Id. at 861.
27. See Holt v. Hobbs, No. 5:11:CV00164 BMS, 2012 WL 993403 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 23, 2012)
(adopting magistrate’s recommendation); Holt v. Hobbs, No. 5:11-cv-00164-BSM-JJV, 2012 WL
994481 (E.D. Ark. Jan. 27, 2012) (magistrate’s recommendation).
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praying on a prayer rug, maintaining the diet required by his faith, and
observing religious holidays.28 The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding
that the Prison had satisfied its burden of showing that the grooming
policy was the least restrictive means of furthering the Prison’s
compelling interests in security.29 The court of appeals reasoned that
prison officials are entitled to deference when they assert security as a
compelling interest unless substantial evidence shows the prison’s
response is exaggerated.30 The court of appeals also held that although
other prisons allow inmates to maintain facial hair, such evidence does
not outweigh deference owed to prison officials because those officials
are more familiar with their own institutions.31
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Prison’s policy, as
applied to Holt without a religious exemption, violated RLUIPA. At the
outset, the Court noted that the sincerity of Holt’s beliefs was not in
dispute, and therefore he satisfied the threshold question for requesting
accommodations for religious beliefs.32 The Court went on to find the
policy substantially burdened Holt’s religious exercise; and the Prison
asserted two compelling interests, but the Prison failed to show that
applying its policy to Holt is the least restrictive means of achieving
either of the Prison’s asserted compelling interests.
First, the Court rejected and corrected the district court’s substantial
burden analysis by clarifying three points: (1) unlike normal Free
Exercise Clause analysis, available alternative means of practicing
religion are not relevant considerations under RLUIPA’s substantial
burden inquiry; (2) RLUIPA protects a religious practice even if that
practice is not compelled by religious belief; and (3) RLUIPA’s
protection is not limited to religious practices shared by all members of
a religious sect, and RLUIPA may even protect some idiosyncratic
beliefs.33 With these points clarified, the Court concluded that the
Prison policy substantially burdened Holt’s religious belief because the
policy required Holt to choose between shaving his beard, which would

28. Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 861; see Holt v. Hobbs, 2012 WL 994481, at *7 (magistrate’s
recommendation).
29. Holt v. Hobbs, 509 F. App’x 561, 562 (8th Cir. 2013), overruled by Holt, 135 S. Ct. 853
(2015).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 862 (citing Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U. S., —, 134 S.
Ct. 2751, 2774 n.28 (2014)). The Court noted that RLUIPA protects “any exercise of religion,
whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.” Id. Though RLUIPA
does not bar inquiry into the sincerity of a belief, see Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 725 n.13
(2005), the Prison did not dispute the sincerity of Holt’s beliefs here. Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 862.
33. Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 862–63.
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violate his religious beliefs, or not shave his beard, which would violate
the Prison’s grooming policy.
Second, because the Prison’s policy substantially burdened Holt’s
religious exercise, the Court applied RLUIPA’s “compelling interest
test,” under which the Prison had the burden of showing that its decision
to deny an exemption to its grooming policy was narrowly tailored to
achieve a compelling government interest.34 This inquiry, the Court
clarified, is more focused on the individual, “requir[ing] the
Government to demonstrate that the compelling interest test is satisfied
through application of the challenged law to . . . the particular claimant
whose sincere exercise of religion is being substantially burdened.”35
The Prison asserted that applying the policy to Holt without
exemption served two compelling interests: stopping the flow of
contraband concealed in beards and facilitating prisoner identification.36
While the Court agreed these were compelling interests,37 it concluded
that the Prison failed to show its policy was the least restrictive means
of furthering either of the asserted compelling interests.38
The Court rejected the Prison’s contraband justification, finding it
“hard to take seriously.”39 The prison argued that an inmate with a halfinch beard could conceal contraband like razor blades in his beard.40
The Magistrate Judge had disbelieved this explanation, but he and all
the lower courts had concluded that they were “bound to defer” to the
Prison’s assertion that its interests would be undermined by granting the
exemption.41
The Supreme Court rejected this “unquestioning
deference,”42 instead analyzing why the Prison’s justification was
insufficient to meet the rigid scrutiny RLUIPA required.43
Under an eminently practical analysis, the Court found that a halfinch beard would not conceal contraband very well because contraband
would be hard to hide and prone to fall out.44 Moreover, instead of
34. See id. at 863 (noting that under the compelling interest test required by RLUIPA, the
prison had to show that the compelling interests were served by applying the policy to the
particular prisoner whose religious practice is substantially burdened, not merely that the policies
were necessary to achieve some broadly formulated interest).
35. See id. (citing Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2779 (internal quotations omitted)).
36. Id. at 863–64.
37. Id. at 863.
38. Id. at 864–65.
39. Id. at 863.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 864.
43. See id. at 863–64 (holding that the Prison’s alleged reasons for its policy are insufficient
and too restrictive).
44. Id. at 863.
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hiding items in a beard, a prisoner could simply hide contraband in the
hair on the top of his head, which the Prison’s grooming standards
permitted to be longer than a half-inch in length.45 The Court ultimately
rejected the contraband justification, reasoning that, “without a degree
of deference that is tantamount to unquestioning acceptance, it is hard to
swallow the argument that denying petitioner a [half-inch] beard
actually furthers the prison’s interest in rooting out contraband.”46 The
Court further explained why denying the exemption, even if it actually
furthered the Prison’s contraband justification, nonetheless failed to be
the least restrictive means of furthering the interest in curbing
contraband. The Court found that searching beards or having a prisoner
run a comb through his beard would be a less restrictive alternative.47
As such, the Court ruled that the interest in eliminating contraband
could not sustain the Prison’s refusal to allow Holt to grow a half-inch
beard.48
The Court also rejected the Prison’s argument that applying its
grooming policy to Holt was necessary to facilitate prisoner
identification. The Prison argued that its policy, as applied to Holt, was
necessary to prevent bearded prisoners from shaving their beards,
thereby disguising their identities, in order to enter restricted areas and
escape. However, the Court found that the Prison failed to establish two
points essential to its identification justification. First, the Court looked
to the practices of many other prisons, which all use a dual-photograph
system to prevent escape through beard shaving. The Court concluded
that the Arkansas Prison failed to show why it could not use a similar
dual-photograph system to achieve the Prison’s interest without
burdening the prisoner’s beard-related religious practice.49 Second, the
Court looked to the Prison’s other policies, which permitted mustaches,
head hair, and quarter-inch beards for medical reasons, and determined
that these too could be shaved off to conceal a prisoner’s identity. The
Court concluded that the Prison failed to show why it permitted other
instances of hair growth but not Holt’s half-inch beard, and therefore
rejected the Prison’s identification justification.
Before concluding its opinion, the Court in dicta provided several

45. Id.
46. Id. at 864.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 866. In this same vein, the Court later states, “‘[w]hile not necessarily controlling,
the policies followed at other well-run institutions would be relevant to a determination of the
need for a particular type of restriction.’” Id. (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 414
n.14 (1974)).
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caveats. First, the Court cut back on the relevance of other prisons’
practices by positing that RLUIPA does not require a prison to grant a
religious exemption simply because other jurisdictions do so.50 Rather,
when many other prisons offer an accommodation, a prison not offering
such an accommodation must provide the court with “persuasive
reasons” to distinguish itself from those other prisons.51 Under
RLUIPA, courts cannot grant deference to prison officials when they
merely assert that their policies justifiably differ; instead, courts must
require prisons to prove that a plausible, less restrictive alternative used
by many other prisons, would be ineffective at the subject prison.52
Second, the Court emphasized how, despite the Holt holding,
RLUIPA still “affords prisons ample ability to maintain security.”53
Specifically, the Court instructed lower courts to be cognizant that
RLUIPA analysis is conducted in a prison setting, but the Court did not
elaborate further on what this means.54 Additionally, if a prison
suspects a prisoner is using a religious activity to “cloak illicit conduct,”
prisons may question the authenticity of a prisoner’s “religiosity” that
forms the basis for a requested accommodation.55 And finally, even if a
prisoner’s religious belief is sincere, prisons may withdraw an
accommodation if the prisoner “abuses the exemption in a manner that
undermines the prison’s compelling interests.”56
Justice Ginsburg concurred only to clarify that she would require one
additional element for successful RLUIPA claims: individuals who
challenge government policies under RLUIPA or RFRA should show
that accommodating their religious belief would not detrimentally affect
others who do not share the belief.57 This element, according to Justice
Ginsburg, was met in Holt58 but not Hobby Lobby.59
Justice Sotomayor concurred in part in order to reconcile striking
down a prison policy in Holt with the emphasis on deference in
Cutter.60 To begin, Justice Sotomayor explained that, under Cutter,
50. Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 866.
51. Id.
52. See id. (explaining that courts “‘must not assume a plausible less restrictive alternative
would be ineffective’” (quoting United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 824
(2000))).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 866–67.
55. Id. 867 (citing Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 725 n.13 (2005)).
56. Id.
57. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
58. See id.
59. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U. S. —, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2787–2806 (2014)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
60. See Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 867 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (reassuring that nothing in the
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courts entertaining RLUIPA section 3 complaints should grant
deference “to the experience and expertise of prison and jail
administrators,”61 and that such deference was due when prison officials
“establish[] necessary regulations and procedures to maintain good
order, security and discipline . . . .”62 The Court’s Holt opinion,
according to Justice Sotomayor, does not preclude courts from granting
deference to prison officials’ reasoning when deference is properly
due.63 Justice Sotomayor posits that after Holt deference is proper
when prison officials offer a “plausible explanation for their chosen
policy that is supported by whatever evidence is reasonably available to
them,”64 but deference is not due when prison officials “declare a
compelling government interest by fiat.”65
In Justice Sotomayor’s view, Holt’s challenge fell into the category
of deference to a fiat, rather than deference to a plausible explanation.
The Prison’s position was fatally wounded by its own failure to
demonstrate with anything more than “unsupported assertions” why less
restrictive policies offered by Holt were insufficient to achieve the
Prison’s compelling interests.66 The Court’s independent judgments
concerning the merits of the alternative approaches, while appropriately
skeptical, were not the reason the Court rejected the prison’s
justifications.67 Under Justice Sotomayor’s approach, courts should
defer to prison officials’ reasoning when those officials justify their
policies with plausible explanations supported by evidence, and not
when their policies are justified by mere fiat or speculation.68
What instruction does Holt offer lower courts analyzing future
RLUIPA claims? The Holt majority and concurrences offer two points
of clarification.
First, courts dealing with matters of first impression under RLUIPA
may turn to RFRA case law by analogy. Throughout the Holt opinion,
Justice Alito—who also authored the Hobby Lobby decision interpreting
RFRA69—cited to the Court’s Hobby Lobby decision in support of

Court’s Holt opinion calls into question Cutter).
61. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 717 (2005).
62. Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 867 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See id. at 868 (explaining that the Prison’s failure, not Court’s independent judgment, is
ultimately fatal to the Prison’s position).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. —, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
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asserted RLUIPA standards.70 Such is not surprising given that both
RFRA and RLUIPA were enacted to “provide very broad protection for
religious liberty.”71 Indeed, RLUIPA was enacted after the Court in
Boerne v. Flores struck down the part of RFRA that applied to the
States.72 Hence, based on the Holt Court’s use of RFRA in applying
RLUIPA, one can conclude that going forward the Court, when
applying RLUIPA, may look to its RFRA jurisprudence to fill in gaps
where RLUIPA case law is lacking.
Second, the Holt Court clarified that the role deference plays in
applying RLUIPA is limited, and that courts should first apply the strict
scrutiny that RLUIPA requires. After Holt, courts should first require
prison officials to adduce some evidence that their policies are actually
necessary to achieve the prison’s asserted compelling interest, and only
upon such a showing should the court grant deference to the officials’
justification.73 Additionally, the Court rejected the Eighth Circuit’s
standard for deference, pursuant to which courts would defer to prison
officials’ judgment about security matters unless there is “substantial
evidence that a prison’s response is exaggerated.”74 The Court clarified
that the burden rests on the prison, not the challenger. Proper deference
analysis under RLUIPA requires the prison to prove that a challenger’s
proposed alternatives would not sufficiently serve the prison’s security
interests; a challenger need not show by “substantial evidence” that the
policy is not narrowly tailored.75 The Court also opted not to follow the
Eighth Circuit’s approach, where it deferred to prison officials’
judgments about “their own institutions” without looking to policies of
other prisons.76 Instead, the Court clarified that other prisons’ policies
allowing the requested religious accommodation may inform a narrow
tailoring analysis, under which the subject prison must offer persuasive
reasons explaining why such an accommodation would not work at the
subject prison.
To conclude, under RLUIPA analysis, courts must not grant
70. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (collecting citations to Hobby Lobby in Holt).
71. Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 859 (citing Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2760 (2014)).
72. Id. at 860; see City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532–36 (1997) (reasoning that
Congress exceeded its power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment when it made RFRA
applicable to the States and their subdivisions).
73. See Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 864 (explaining the prison’s responsibility to prove that its policy is
the least restrictive means of furthering the asserted justification in not providing an
accommodation to the prisoner); id. at 866 (clarifying that lower courts erred when deferring to
prison officials’ mere “say-so” that they could not accommodate the prisoner’s request for an
exemption under RLUIPA).
74. Id. at 861.
75. See id. at 867.
76. Id. at 861.
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“unquestioning deference” when a prison asserts that its policy is
necessary, without exemption, to achieve the prison’s interest in
security.77 Rather, prisons have to do more than point to their interest
allegedly served by not granting an exemption; they must “prove that
denying the exemption is the least restrictive means of furthering a
compelling governmental interest.”78 But it would be incorrect to
conclude that Cutter is implicitly overruled, for the Court did
acknowledge that “[p]rison officials are experts in running prisons and
evaluating the likely effects of altering prison rules, and courts should
respect that expertise.”79 Hence, Cutter’s general command for
deference remains. “But,” as the Court concluded, “that respect [due to
prison officials] does not justify the abdication of the responsibility,
conferred by Congress, to apply RLUIPA’s rigorous standard.”80

77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 864.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.

